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private and not-for-profit sectors, and civil society. 
Our mission is to enrich the understanding and practice  
of authentic, ethical and sustainable forms of leadership  
in Australia.
Leadership for the Greater Good can take many forms. It 
always needs to be locally relevant and culturally appropriate. 
However, in all cases it recognises the legitimacy of the 
individual as citizen, the reality of our shared interests, and the 
importance of judiciously balancing competing interests  
in ways that enhance the public good.  
The emergence in Australia of a political, business and civil 
culture that elevates immediate private interests over  
long-term public interests is a worrying sign that the  
Greater Good and leadership in its service is insufficiently 
valued in our society. 
It is a social and research priority to understand the meaning 
and the myriad manifestations of Leadership for the Greater 
Good so as to enrich the practice of leadership in Australia.
Leadership for the Greater Good – Values
The Swinburne Leadership Institute’s conception of Leadership for the Greater 
Good is grounded in the values and principles embedded in the culture and 
aspirations of Swinburne University, including:
Innovation and creativity in solving real-world problems. 
Integrity, honesty and the highest ethical standards in everything we do.
Accountability to ourselves, each other, and the communities we serve through 
transparency and evidence-based decision making.
Celebration of diversity and respect the strength that difference creates. 
Teamwork and collaboration through mutual respect, open communication and 
the sharing of responsibility. 
Sustainability at personal, group, national and planetary scales.
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Introduction
The public interest. The public good. The common good. All these terms 
describe ways of thinking about our collective selves and our shared 
interests that transcend our memberships of such groups as families, 
teams, and workplaces that typically inform our understanding of who 
we are and pattern our expectations and experience of the social world. 
Whereas groups such as these are ‘concrete’ in the sense that we interact 
with many of the members of these groups, know the group’s defining 
features, and can recognise exemplary members, the community of 
individual citizens to whom concepts like the public good apply is more 
abstract. Indeed, we know such communities not through direct face-to-
face interaction with their members but rather indirectly, through our 
imaginations. It is not for nothing that Benedict Anderson (1983) described 
such collective, temporally continuous entities as ‘imagined communities’.
In this article, I explore the idea that certain of our current cultural ideals 
and practices may be inimical to our ability to imagine and experience 
ourselves as members of these imagined, enduring communities. 
In particular, I explore the idea that in our prevailing culture of flux, 
impermanence, and uncertainty, characterised by Bauman (2012) as ‘liquid’ 
modernity, we have fallen out of the habit of thinking about our ourselves as 
members of an imagined community of citizens with common interests who 
act with collective purpose in the service of these interests. Given that the 
type of imagined community necessary to overcome the kinds of problems 
that deform the public good is precisely the type of collective identity that is 
neither valorised nor cultivated in liquid modernity, we find ourselves less 
capable of acting in concert with one another to enhance the public good 
than we ideally should be. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, it affords us 
an opportunity to re-imagine the common good and to enact, entrench and 
expand the practice of leadership in its service. I explore this possibility in 
the third part of this article.
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Before we begin, I hasten to add that 
in this paper, which is nothing more 
than a provisional sketch, I focus on 
global, latent trends that encompass 
and integrate a multitude of specific 
developments rather than on specific, 
circumscribed, and localised changes 
in society. Accordingly, my focus is this 
article is not on Australia specifically but 
rather on the nexus of Anglo-American 
countries and cultures in which 
Australia is embedded. Notwithstanding 
the important historical and cultural 
differences between nations like the 
Australia, Britain, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand and the United States, there are 
also many similarities, which usefully 
expands our understanding of the types 
of general, latent trends that variously 
promote and thwart the public good, as 
well as the affordance for, and practice 
of, leadership in its service.
A further point to note is that my 
musings about the public good—
specifically, the problems that thwart it 
and the leadership that promotes it—are 
premised on two assumptions. The first 
assumption is that wicked and super 
wicked problems—those that resist easy 
definition, cannot be cleanly delineated 
from other problems, and are neither 
resolvable via compliance with experts 
nor obedience to authorities (Grint, 2010; 
Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, Auld, 2012; 
Rittel & Webber, 1973)—are the types 
of problems that pose the greatest 
challenges to the public good. 
The second, related assumption is 
that addressing wicked and super 
wicked problems requires the active 
participation of the individual and 
collective actors involved—not just 
experts and authorities (Kahane, 2004, 
2010; Levin et al., 2012). In general, this 
necessitates that ‘we’, all of us, take 
collective responsibility for our collective 
problems, which is an approach to 
problem solving that is enabled by the 
judicious exercise of leadership (Grint, 
2010).
Given the centrality of the concept 
of continuity to the arguments in 
this article about the public good, I 
begin with an overview of the ways 
in which we understand ourselves 
as entities that persevere through 
time. Next, consideration turns to 
how the experience of volatility, 
impermanence and uncertainty in the 
social environments in which we are 
embedded can disrupt our experience 
of self-continuity, the ease with which 
we can discern our shared interests, 
and our capacity to act with collective 
purpose in the service of these 
interests. Finally, I consider some of the 
conceptual and practical challenges that 
need to be met to enhance our ability 
to imagine, talk about, and act in the 
service of the public good.
Given that the type of imagined community 
necessary to overcome the kinds of 
problems that deform the public good is 
precisely the type of collective identity 
that is neither valorised nor cultivated 
in liquid modernity, we find ourselves 
less capable of acting in concert with one 
another to enhance the public good than 
we ideally should be. Notwithstanding this 
state of affairs, it affords us an opportunity 
to re-imagine the common good and to 
enact, entrench and expand the practice of 
leadership in its service.
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Identity and continuity
One of the core aspects of the human self is the need to experience the self 
as a unity through time and space. That is, beyond the obvious physical and 
psychological changes that occur over the course of a lifetime, we tend to 
need to experience ourselves as essentially the same people as we were in 
the past and will be in the future (Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008). This is called 
self-continuity and it is crucial for our psychological survival.
Although this need to experience a sustained sense of self through time 
is a generic feature of the human psyche, our understanding of who 
we are, were, and will be is constructed within a larger ‘community of 
minds’—family, friends, colleagues—bound by a common language, beliefs, 
and identity (Bird & Reese, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Reicher, 2008). That is, 
beginning in childhood and continuing throughout our lives, we develop an 
understanding of ourselves as an entity that perseveres through time, in 
part, through the medium of talk with family and friends. 
Further, through this sense of being situated in, and belonging to, 
social groups—some with which we will identify—we also develop an 
understanding of ourselves as members of temporally continuous social 
entities: families, tribes, nations. Indeed, such is the strength of our need 
to believe that the groups of which we are members are historically and 
culturally continuous that we perceive continuity even in the midst of change 
(Hamilton, Levine, & Thurston, 2008). Consider, for example, our perception 
of football teams as essentially the same groups over time despite 
membership changes, relocations to different cities and states, and name 
changes.
Our understanding of ourselves is thus characterised both by a sense that 
we are unique and distinctive from others, called the personal self, and a 
sense that we share attributes with others, called the collective self. Further, 
in the same way that we need to experience personal self-continuity, we 
have a comparable need to experience collective self-continuity—to believe 
that the groups of which we are members, and with which we identify, 
will continue to exist as essentially the same social entities over time. As 
decades of research attest, group membership plays an important role in 
a person’s perception of who she is (e.g., Muslim, Australian) beyond her 
unique, idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g., extrovert, playful) and contributes 
to a person’s maintenance of a stable sense of self over time (Iyer, Jetten, & 
Tsivrikos, 2008).
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However, although self-continuity seems 
to be an inherent feature of the human 
self, the experience of self-continuity 
is not invariant over the course of a 
person’s lifetime or across people 
(Sani, 2008). A lack of self-continuity 
is considered one of the most typical 
disorders of the self. For example, 
people who suffer from schizophrenia, 
neuroses or organic states may 
experience a sense of discontinuity or 
disconnection between their present 
and past or future selves (Sani, 2008). 
A striking example of what it is like 
to experience self-discontinuity was 
provided by the psychiatrist Oliver 
Sachs (1985) who described a man 
with Korsakov syndrome who, unable 
to maintain a genuine narrative of 
self-continuity, did not know, at any 
given point in time, where or who he 
was. However, it is not with such people 
that I am concerned here. Rather, I 
am more interested in the variation in 
self-continuity experienced even among 
those adjudged psychologically normal. 
Perhaps most relevant to the arguments 
of this article is recent, albeit indirect, 
evidence that the experience of 
destabilising life events can disrupt 
the experience and expectation of 
self-continuity. To illustrate, in a study 
conducted by Bartels and Rips (2010) 
participants read about characters who 
undergo a series of small (e.g., acquiring 
an allergy, graduation from university) 
and large (e.g., religious conversion, 
kidnap) life-changing events at different 
points in their lives (e.g., 1, 10, 20 and 
30 years from the present). After this, 
participants were asked to judge the 
extent to which the characters were 
essentially the same people—in terms 
of their personality, beliefs, likes and 
dislikes, goals, and ideals—after these 
events as they were before these events. 
Unlike the experience of small events, 
the experience of large life-changing 
events was judged to render the 
characters different people to the people 
they were prior to the destabilising 
event. That is, large life-changing events 
were adjudged to create such instability 
in a person’s identity that they effected 
a disconnection between the selves 
that exist at different points in time. 
Our ability to persist through time as a 
psychological unity thus is subject to the 
vicissitudes of life.
Further, although research into the 
consequences of self-discontinuity 
is in its infancy, the available 
evidence suggests that the personal 
consequences of experiencing 
weak psychological connectedness, 
specifically weak connectedness 
between our present and future selves, 
can be profound. To illustrate, compared 
with people who feel strongly connected 
to their future selves, those who feel 
weakly connected tend to save less 
(Bryan, & Hershfield, 2012; Ersner-
Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-
Larkin, & Knutson, 2009), spend more 
(Bartels & Urminsky, 2011), demonstrate 
higher rates of temporal discounting 
(Bartels & Rips, 2010), behave 
less ethically (Hershfield, Cohen, & 
Thompson, 2012; van Gelder, Hershfield, 
& Nordgren, 2013) and cope worse 
with threats, such as job loss (Sadeh & 
Karniol, 2012). 
The reasoning for this, which can be 
traced to the philosopher Derek Parfit 
(1986) and which has been corroborated 
empirically (Bartels & Rips, 2010; 
Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 
2009; Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008), 
is that when a person feels disconnected 
from her future self—such as the self 
that exists in twenty years’ time—the 
future self can seem so dissimilar to the 
present self that, at the extreme, she can 
be perceived as essentially a different 
person altogether. Understood in this 
way, the effects of self-discontinuity 
on our thinking and decision-making 
begin to make sense. If an individual 
perceives her future self as essentially a 
different person to her present self—in 
terms of personality or temperament, 
for example—then it does not especially 
matter if she spends all her disposal 
income in present rather than saving 
some of it for the future. After all, if the 
future self is regarded as ‘not me’, then 
saving for the benefit of the future self 
is akin to giving money to a different 
person. 
One of the core aspects of the human self 
is the need to experience the self as a unity 
through time and space. Our understanding 
of who we are, were, and will be is 
constructed within a larger ‘community 
of minds’—family, friends, colleagues—
bound by a common language, beliefs, and 
identity.
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The point of all this is to say that in order 
to act in ways that have wholesome 
consequences for our future selves, we 
must believe that the future recipient 
of our actions (i.e., ‘future me’) will be 
the same person who expends effort 
in the present (i.e., ‘present me’). For 
example, in order to save for retirement, 
I must believe that ‘future me’, who will 
spend these savings, is essentially the 
same person as ‘present me’, who will 
create these savings. Experiencing and 
expecting self-continuity therefore partly 
undergirds an orientation to the future 
and provides an affordance for planning 
and action that enhances our long-
term interests (e.g., regular, voluntary 
contributions to our superannuation 
account), even if it appears to damage 
some aspects of our immediate 
interests (e.g., eating out less often). The 
experience and expectation of individual 
self-continuity is thus a prerequisite 
for recognising that the identity and 
interests of our present and future 
selves are coincident, not incongruent.
The relationship between our present 
and future collective selves seems to 
work in a similar way. That is, in order to 
behave in ways that are in the interests 
of our future collective selves (e.g., 
future Australians), we must believe 
that our future collective selves will be 
essentially the same people that ‘we’ 
are now (e.g., present Australians). This 
seems especially important if we need 
to decide whether to act in ways that 
damage the interests of our present 
selves—personal and collective—in 
order to create benefits for our future 
collective selves (e.g., paying higher 
taxes now to mitigate future ‘structural 
deficits’), or to spare our future collective 
selves from bearing costs that ought to 
have borne by our present selves (e.g., 
pricing ‘externalities’ into the cost of 
goods and services). The experience and 
expectation of collective self-continuity 
thus partly undergirds the collective 
mobilisation that is required to enact 
joint projects for the future (Reicher, 
2008), such as the creation of policies, 
institutions and social structures that 
promote the public good but which 
may ‘damage’ some aspects of our 
immediate private interests. 
Given that: (i) the experience and 
expectation of self-continuity promotes 
an orientation to, and an ability to 
plan for, the future; (ii) the collective 
mobilisation to enact joint projects 
requires the experience and expectation 
of self-continuity, especially it collective 
variant; and (iii) the experience and 
expectation of destabilising life events 
can disrupt self-continuity, it is pertinent 
to reflect on our experience of individual 
and collective self-continuity and social 
and economic conditions and to ask 
whether the socio-economic and cultural 
context in which we are embedded 
sustains or, at minimum, does not 
disrupt self-continuity. Unhappily, our 
prevailing climate of volatility and 
uncertainty means that this question 
cannot be answered wholly in the 
affirmative. It is to this that attention 
turns next.
The experience and expectation of 
collective self-continuity thus partly 
undergirds the collective mobilisation  
that is required to enact joint projects for 
the future, such as the creation of policies, 
institutions and social structures that 
promote the public good but which may 
‘damage’ some aspects of our immediate 
private interests.
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Liquid modernity
According to Bauman (2012), who coined the term ‘liquid modernity’, the 
transition from ‘solid’ to ‘liquid’ modernity involved the shift from a time in 
which humans sought to create a well-ordered world of predictable, stable 
structures to a world in which the very ideas of order and stability no longer 
have any purchase. Nowadays it is a commonplace that to hear and read 
that change is the only permanence and uncertainty the only certainty. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed account 
of the emergence of liquid modernity, some broad-brush outlines are 
nevertheless warranted. Given the centrality of the concept of continuity to 
the arguments I am making in this article, it is instructive to begin at time in 
the twentieth century when continuity, order, and stability were of primary 
concern to us; namely, the period immediately after the Second World War 
that lasted until the early 1970s—a period sometimes referred to as ‘the 
Golden Age’, although it was certainly not a gilded age.
In his 2006 Boyer lectures, former Reserve Bank Governor Ian MacFarlane 
characterised this period as one preoccupied with “the search for stability.” 
Although MacFarlane’s focus was on the development of an approach 
to macroeconomic policy that could ensure stable economic growth and 
full employment, the search for stability described, more generally, our 
response to our shared experience of vulnerability, instability, and insecurity 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century when the world, as we 
knew it, collapsed. 
Although the specific stabilising policies and institutions varied from 
country to country, these stabilisers reflected a belief in the possibility and 
virtue of collective action for the collective good, as well as a significant 
role for the state and the public sector (Judt, 2010). Within nations, strong 
unions, collective bargaining and welfare provisions, which buttressed 
the perception that shared interests existed, contributed to this period of 
equality and stability (Sennett, 1999). At the international level, agreements, 
such as the Bretton Woods currency agreements—the system of regulations 
and institutions that regulated the international monetary system—were 
established, which effectively constrained, and thus stabilised, the behaviour 
of member countries. The search for stability was therefore as much a 
national project as an international one.
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At the level of the lives of individual men 
and later, women, the bureaucracies of 
big national institutions, business and 
government, provided an important 
social context for the personal 
experience of order and stability. 
Although these bureaucracies were 
not regarded uncritically—evidenced, 
for example, by claims that they held 
individuals in an iron grip—these 
institutions did nevertheless possess the 
modest virtue of providing people with 
a relatively stable environment within 
which to construct their understanding 
of themselves and their life course 
(Sennett, 2006). Further, given that 
people could often expect to remain in 
these organisations for many years, 
perhaps all their working lives, and 
could expect to accrue skills, status and 
income slowly, but predictably, over time, 
these organisations arguably created 
the stable conditions that enabled the 
experience and expectation of self-
continuity in its personal and collective 
forms. However, as the 1970s faded, 
the stable, ordered world within which 
these institutions were embedded—in 
which individuals were themselves were 
embedded—began to transmogrify into 
the world of flux, impermanence, and 
uncertainty we know today.
Considerable research attests to the 
significant economic and sociocultural 
changes that have occurred since the 
1970s, especially but not exclusively 
in Anglo-American countries (e.g., 
Galbraith, 1994; Judt, 2010; Reich, 
2008; Saul, 1995; Sennett, 2006). These 
scholars conclude that many of the 
institutions and policies that were 
established after the Second World 
War, designed to promote equality, 
stability, and order, were dismantled 
after the 1970s. In this transition from 
‘solid’ to ‘liquid’ modernity, many of the 
stable structures within which people 
experienced, and expected to experience, 
their lives, melted away. 
Two key changes were especially 
consequential.  First, after the Bretton 
Woods system collapsed, capital 
could be transferred across the globe 
expeditiously (Bordo & Eichengreen, 
1993; Mason & Asher, 1973). Second, 
because of improvements in 
communication technology, information 
about companies in other regions, 
integral to international investment, 
could be accessed readily (Sassen, 
1998).  
These two changes, in concert with other 
cultural developments, transformed 
the social and economic landscape. 
In particular, rather than invest in 
companies that may grow slowly 
but surely over an extended period, 
investors began to shift their attention 
more to abrupt increases in share prices 
(Sassen, 1998). To fulfill this objective, 
these investors frequently redistributed 
their capital across companies 
(Sennett, 2006). Investment in shares 
thus became an increasingly complex 
endeavour, demanding considerable 
expertise (Harrison, 1994), and these 
activities were primarily confined 
to enormous financial institutions, 
including merchant banks. 
These powerful institutions began 
to dominate the management of 
companies (Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera 
Jr., & Raymond, 1999). Because these 
shareholders preferred short-term 
profits in share prices rather than 
long-term profits through dividends 
(Sennett, 2006), companies did not strive 
to evolve and to develop gradually and 
progressively. Instead, they attempted to 
exploit every opportunity that emerged 
(Sassen, 1998). These organisations 
began to respond swiftly to short-
term, sometimes fleeting, changes 
in the market (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1996). Products, services, brands, and 
processes were frequently refined 
or even transformed, and previous 
endeavors were often abandoned hastily. 
In this volatile environment—half of 
the most turbulent financial quarters 
since 1980 have occurred since 2002—
the strategies, values, objectives, and 
activities of organisations tended to 
change abruptly (e.g., Robinson, Kraatz, 
& Rousseau, 1994). To respond efficiently 
and adeptly to fluctuating demands, 
downsizing proliferated; the composition 
of teams and departments changed 
frequently, and temporary contracts 
superseded many permanent roles 
(Lawler, 2005). Rather than gradually 
ascend the corporate ladder, which 
was a characteristic of organisational 
life in the time of solid modernity, 
people frequently relocated to other 
departments, organisations, or even 
nations to secure attractive jobs 
(Sennett, 2006). This culture of volatility, 
instability, and compulsive change, 
which Sennett (2006) calls ‘the culture of 
the new capitalism’, soon infiltrated the 
public sector, smaller organisations, and 
society in general.
The influence of these social and cultural 
changes on the qualities needed to 
flourish in today’s unstable, fragmentary 
social conditions has been profound. As 
argued by Sennett (2006) in his incisive 
account of the lived experience of 
individual men and women in the culture 
of the new capitalism, flourishing in 
these conditions seems to be contingent 
on an individual’s ability to address three 
challenges. The first challenge concerns 
how to manage short-term relationships, 
and the self, while migrating, nomad-like, 
from task to task, job to job, and place to 
place. Without a long-term frame within 
which a person can make sense of her 
experiences, an individual may have to 
improvise her life narrative, or even do 
without any sustained sense of self; that 
is, self-continuity. The second challenge, 
according to Sennett, concerns talent; 
specifically, how to develop new skills as 
reality’s demands shift. In the modern 
economy, the shelf life of many skills 
is short and many workers now need 
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to retrain many times throughout their 
working lives. The third challenge, which 
is related to the previous two, concerns 
what Sennett calls ‘surrender’; that is, 
how to let go of ideas, skills, people, 
relationships, and even identities. 
At this point, the challenges posed by 
liquid modernity to our experience 
and expectation of self-continuity start 
to come into focus. With respect to 
personal self-continuity, which inheres 
in the sense that we remain essentially 
the same people over time in terms 
of our personality and temperament, 
our sense of ourselves as a persistent 
psychological unity requires that we 
experience a relatively stable life course, 
unperturbed by major disruptions. The 
volatility of our prevailing social and 
especially economic environments, in 
conjunction with burgeoning economic 
(e.g., employment, income and labour 
market), physical and political insecurity 
(Judt, 2010; Standing, 2011), suggests 
that the threats to our experience and 
expectation of personal self-continuity 
are very serious indeed. Relatedly, the 
fraying of the social fabric of civil society 
(Putnam, 2000) and the ascendance of 
the idea of individual responsibility for 
life’s risks (Hacker, 2006) has deeply 
eroded our sense of ourselves as 
members of a community of citizens 
with shared interests and a common 
future, compromising our experience 
and expectation of collective self-
continuity.
If the challenges posed by liquid 
modernity to our experience and 
expectation of individual self-continuity 
are profound, the challenges posed 
to our experience and expectation of 
collective self-continuity—in the sense of 
a disinterested, temporally continuous 
community of citizens—must be an order 
of magnitude worse. These propositions, 
in combination with the idea that 
collective self-continuity undergirds the 
collective mobilisation required to enact 
joint projects, leads to the propositions 
that, presently, ‘we’ are ill-prepared to 
take collective responsibility for the 
wicked collective problems that ail 
us and thwart the public good and, in 
consequence, provide little space for 
leadership for the public good. 
As the 1970s faded, the stable, ordered 
world within which these institutions 
were embedded—in which individuals 
were themselves were embedded—began 
to transmogrify into the world of flux, 
impermanence, and uncertainty we know 
today. In this transition from ‘solid’ to ‘liquid’ 
modernity, many of the stable structures 
within which people experienced, and 
expected to experience, their lives,  
melted away.
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Leadership for the public good
Given our prevailing climate of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and 
ambiguity—liquid modernity—the challenges to imagining the public good 
and enacting, entrenching, and expanding the practice of leadership in its 
service seem profound. The range of perspectives relevant to an analysis 
of this state of affairs and how it might be remedied is vast. As such, I 
necessary screen off a number of important issues and focus narrowly on a 
couple of conceptual and practical challenges. 
The first challenge is conceptual. Specifically, what kind of collective identity 
and self-continuity undergirds the collective mobilisation required to enact 
public good-enhancing projects? As suggested at the beginning of this 
article, the type of collective identity and self-continuity required is most 
likely not the type gleaned from our experience of face-to-face interactions 
with those who belong to the same teams, clubs, and workplaces. Rather, 
the type of collective identity and collective self-continuity required is 
probably more akin to the abstract collectives known to us only through our 
imaginations, called imagined communities. 
However, the type of abstract, ethically inclusive, temporally continuous 
imagined community to which concepts like the public good apply differ 
from the more concrete everyday groups of which we are members, such 
as work organisations, in ways more important than how we come to know 
them. In particular, the collectives that give concepts like public or common 
good meaning differ from collectives like organisations in terms of where 
legitimacy lies. That is, they differ in terms of whose interests are accorded 
primacy in deliberations about the shape of our world. In collectives like 
organisations, legitimacy lies with the group, which means that the interests 
of individuals are subservient to the interests of the group. By contrast, in 
collectives such as the disinterested imagined communities I am describing 
here legitimacy lies with the individual. More precisely, legitimacy lies with 
the individual citizenry acting as a whole (Saul, 1995). 
What kind of collective identity and 
self-continuity undergirds the collective 
mobilisation required to enact public  
good-enhancing projects?
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As argued by the philosopher John 
Ralston Saul in his 1995 Massey 
lectures, Western, especially Anglo-
American, societies have witnessed a 
slow shift in recent decades in terms 
of where legitimacy resides from 
democracy towards corporatism. At risk 
of romanticising the past, the evidence 
does seem to suggest that it is harder 
now than it was even a generation ago 
to imagine, talk about, and act in the 
service of the public good. For example, 
the economist Ross Garnaut (2013) has 
argued that a new political culture has 
emerged in Australia that make it much 
more difficult to pursue policy reform in 
the broad public interest than it was two 
or three decades ago. 
That such change has occurred conveys 
something deeply important: the way 
we think about our society and where 
legitimacy lies in it is an acquired 
condition, not a natural one. Indeed, 
much of what appears ‘natural’ today—
our obsession with wealth creation, 
the cult of markets, privatisation 
and the private sector, the growing 
disparities between rich and poor—in 
fact dates from the 1980s (Judt, 2010). 
Our mindsets and worldviews are, 
therefore, malleable, which potentially 
affords us an opportunity to re-imagine 
the meaning of the public good and to 
re-discover the ways in which we may 
provide an affordance for, and expand 
the practice of, disinterested leadership 
in the service of the public good.
Given the ways in which our mindsets, 
worldviews and self-concepts have 
changed over the last forty years, 
the second challenge is practical. If 
legitimacy increasingly resides with 
groups, rather than with the individual 
citizenry acting a whole, how can we 
effect a shift in our understanding of 
leadership as a type of social action that 
is about more than the representation 
of, and advocacy for, sectoral or special 
interests? How can we enhance 
the value of disinterested—that is, 
impartial—leadership for the common 
good? This is, of course, an enormous 
question and well beyond the scope of 
this article. Instead, I will focus on what 
senior figures in groups with narrow 
or special interests can do directly and 
indirectly to elevate the status of the 
public good, our ability to think about it, 
and our affordance for leadership in the 
service of it—if there is a will to do so.
To understand how the status of the 
public good can be ameliorated directly,  
I draw on the insights of the late 
systems theorist Donella Meadows 
about leverage points in complex 
systems. According to Meadows, 
although our judgements about the 
nature of problems in complex systems 
are often correct, our intuitions about 
how to solve problems in these systems 
are frequently misguided. To illustrate, 
the idea that ethical failures are central 
to understanding the causes of some 
organisational crises is basically sound. 
However, a typical intuitive response 
to solve the problem of ethical failure 
in organisations is to push harder, as it 
were, to increase the practice of ethical 
leadership. This might take the form of 
sending senior figures and management 
teams to expensive leadership 
development programs. A less obvious, 
but more effective and systemic 
response is to remove the factors that 
enable and sustain the problem in the 
first place, such as modifying the social 
structures and expectancies that trigger 
the unconscious biases that undergird 
unethical behaviour (see Bazerman 
& Banaji, 2004, for a review of these 
unconscious biases). 
I would offer similar comments how 
senior figures could elevate the status 
of the public good and leadership in 
its service in their organisations. In 
particular, instead of advocating for 
more public-oriented approaches to 
leadership, which, in any event, may 
leave the status quo unchanged, efforts 
to ameliorate the legitimacy of the 
public good, and the virtue of action in 
its service, might be better served by 
removing the obstacles to these ends. 
How might this be achieved? An obvious 
If legitimacy increasingly resides with 
groups, rather than with the individual 
citizenry acting a whole, how can we effect 
a shift in our understanding of leadership 
as a type of social action that is about more 
than the representation of, and advocacy 
for, sectoral or special interests?
A typical intuitive response to solve the 
problem of ethical failure in organisations 
is to push harder, as it were, to increase the 
practice of ethical leadership. This might 
take the form of sending senior figures 
and management teams to expensive 
leadership development programs. A less 
obvious, but more effective and systemic 
response is to remove the factors that 
enable and sustain the problem in the 
first place, such as modifying the social 
structures and expectancies that trigger 
the unconscious biases that undergird 
unethical behaviour.
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place to start is by curbing or, better, 
ending the deployment of lobbyists and 
special-interest groups that seek to 
undermine the public good. As argued 
by Bazerman and Watkins (2004) in their 
perspicuous account of why leaders fail 
to act to prevent ‘predictable surprises’—
crises they should have seen coming—
there are a number of individuals and 
special-interest groups that are highly 
skilled at corrupting the political system 
for their own benefit. The political 
activities of these individuals and groups 
play a crucial role in accounting for why 
we do not act on what we know. 
If public good-promoting activities are 
enacted, or advocated for, by senior 
figures who are regarded as exemplary 
group members, which makes them 
powerful agents of continuity and 
change in their organisations (van 
Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & Bobbio, 
2008), then such figures can begin 
to create a constituency, and thus an 
affordance, for leadership for the public 
good. However, given that the benefits of 
these activities may be delayed, and the 
possibility that the ultimate beneficiaries 
may not be the same actors as those 
who performed these activities, it is 
crucial that those exercising leadership 
for the public good experience and 
expect personal and especially collective 
self-continuity.
The indirect approach to our challenges 
is vastly more complex than the 
direct approach because it involves 
grappling with dynamic, generative, 
and social complexities that are an 
order of magnitude greater than those 
encountered in single organisations. To 
discern the broad outlines of what an 
indirect approach to these challenges 
might look like, it is helpful to draw 
on the ideas discussed earlier about 
our need for self-continuity and the 
transmogrification of our systems. 
Specifically, these insights should give 
us pause for thought about how we 
ought to design our organisational, 
social, and economic systems to 
promote the experience and expectation 
of self-continuity.
As argued earlier, in order to behave 
in ways that are in the interests of our 
future collective selves, we must believe 
that our future collective selves are, in 
some essential sense, the same people 
that ‘we’ are now. This is especially 
important if we need to decide whether 
to act in ways that appear to damage 
some aspects of our immediate private 
interests in order to create benefits for, 
or spare costs to, our future personal 
and collective selves. How, though, 
might we begin to cultivate this ethically 
inclusive, temporally enduring sense of 
‘us’? I would make two remarks here 
about historical memory and wicked 
problem solving, respectively.
Although I would not necessarily 
advocate for a wholesale reprisal of 
the response we issued during our 
civilization’s most recent experience 
of shared vulnerability (i.e., the various 
forms of social democracy we imagined 
and enacted after the Second World 
War), I would nevertheless argue that we 
would be remiss to deny ourselves the 
benefits of the insights of this historical 
period as we grapple with our problems. 
Indeed, I would go further and suggest 
that, especially in ‘new world’ Anglo-
American nations that decimated and 
displaced their traditional owners, their 
First Peoples, we need to cast our minds 
even further back so as to construct an 
even more ethically sophisticated sense 
of collective identity and continuity. 
Failure to do so would not only deny us 
the use of useful memory, demeaning 
In order to behave in ways that are in the 
interests of our future collective selves, 
we must believe that our future collective 
selves are, in some essential sense, the 
same people that ‘we’ are now. How, 
though, might we begin to cultivate this 
ethically inclusive, temporally enduring 
sense of ‘us’?
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us to impoverished ahistorical 
rationality, but it would also deny us vital 
opportunities to cultivate the experience 
and expectation of collective continuity—
the very psychological resources we 
need to enact joint projects for the 
future. 
My second comment is about addressing 
wicked problems. Throughout this article 
I have highlighted our fundamental need 
to experience self-continuity, the ways in 
which self-continuity can be disrupted 
by the experience of volatility, instability, 
and insecurity, and the emergence and 
entrenchment of a socio-economic 
context, termed liquid modernity, which 
is characterised by flux, impermanence, 
and uncertainty. Wittingly or otherwise, 
we have created precisely the types 
of conditions that are inimical to the 
experience of self-continuity and our 
capacity to enact joint projects to 
enhance the public good. It behoves us 
to enjoin the insights we have gleaned 
through applied reason, our memory 
of who we are, and our imaginings of 
who we will be in our efforts to solve 
our wicked problems. Specifically, it 
is imperative that we partly think and 
partly feel our way, in manner akin to 
design thinking, towards the discovery 
and cultivation of the ideas and, 
eventually, conditions that undergird the 
experience and expectation of continuity 
in both its narrowest and most ethically 
inclusive senses. To offer but one 
example, an idea like flexicurity, which 
attempts to resolve the tension between 
needs of individuals for security with 
the needs of organisations for flexibility, 
is illustrative of an idea that combines 
memory, reason, ethics, and imagination 
to balance competing interests in such 
a way that self-continuity and the public 
good is enhanced. 
Leadership for the public good is plays a 
crucial role in enacting, entrenching and 
expanding the conditions that undergird 
self-continuity and promote the public 
good, but it is nevertheless incumbent 
on us, as individual citizens acting in 
concert, to help create an affordance 
for it. Happily, there are myriad 
opportunities to do so.
 
Leadership for the public good is plays a 
crucial role in enacting, entrenching and 
expanding the conditions that undergird 
self-continuity and promote the public 
good, but it is nevertheless incumbent on 
us, as individual citizens acting in concert, 
to help create an affordance for it. 
14
SWINBURNE LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE
References
Albert, M. (1993). Capitalism against capitalism (translated by P. 
Haviland). London: Whurr.
Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities. London: Verso.
Bartels, D. M., & Rips, L. J. (2010). Psychological connectedness 
and intertemporal choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 139(1), 49-69.
Bartels, D. M., & Urminsky, O. (2011). On intertemporal selfishness: 
How the perceived instability of identity underlies impatient 
consumption. Journal of Consumer Research, 38, 182-198.
Baumol, W., Litan, R., & Schramm, C. (2007). Good capitalism, 
bad capitalism, and the economics of growth and prosperity. 
Newhaven and London: Yale University Press.
Bauman, Z. (2012). Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bazerman, M. H., & Banaji, M. R. (2004). The social psychology of 
ordinary ethical failures. Social Justice Research, 17(2),  
111-115.
Bazerman, M., & Watkins, M. (2004). Predictable surprises. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press.
Bordo, M. D., & Eichengreen, B. (Eds.) (1993). A retrospective on the 
Bretton Woods System: Lessons for international monetary 
reform. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bryan, C. J., & Hershfield, H. E. (2012). You owe it to yourself: 
Boosting retirement savings with a responsibility-based 
appeal. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3), 
429-432.
Crutchley, C. E. Jensen, M. R. H., Jahera Jr., J. S., & Raymond, J. E. 
(1999).  Agency problems and the simultaneity of financial 
decision making: The role of institutional ownership. 
International Review of Financial Analysis, 8, 177-197.
Ersner-Hershfield, H., Garton, M. T., Ballard, K., Samanez-Larkin, G. 
R., & Knutson, B. (2009). Don’t stop thinking about tomorrow: 
Individual differences in future self-continuity account for saving. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 4(4), 280-286.
Ersner-Hershfield, H., Wimmer, G. E., & Knutson, B. (2009). Saving 
for the future self: Neural measures of future self-continuity 
predict temporal discounting. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 4, 85-92. 
Galbraith, J. K. (1994). A journey through economic time: A first hand 
view. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Garnaut, R. (2013). Dog days: Australia after the boom. Collingwood: 
Redback.
Grint, K. (2010). The cuckoo clock syndrome: Addicted to command, 
allergic to leadership. European Management Journal, 28, 306-
313.
Hacker, J. S. (2006). The great risk shift. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. (1996). Competing in the new economy: 
Managing out of bounds. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 
237-242.
Hamilton, D. L., Levine, J. M., & Thurston, J. A. (2008). Perceiving 
continuity and change in groups. In F. Sani (Ed.) Self continuity: 
Individual and collective perspectives (pp. 117-130). New York: 
Psychology Press.
Harrison, B. (1994). The dark side of flexible production. Technology 
Review, 97, 38-45.
Hershfield, H. E., Cohen, T. R., & Thompson, L. (2012). Short horizons 
and tempting situations: Lack of continuity to our future 
selves leads to unethical decision-making and behavior. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 117, 
298-310.
Iyer, A., Jetten, J., & Tsivrikos, D. (2008). Torn between identities: 
Predictors of adjustment to identity change. In F. Sani (Ed.) Self 
continuity: Individual and collective perspectives (pp. 187-197). 
New York: Psychology Press.
Judt, T. (2010). Ill fares the land. London: Penguin Books.
Kahane, A. (2004). Solving tough problems: An open way of talking, 
listening, and creating new realities. San Francisco: Berrett-
Koehler.
Kahane, A. (2010). Power and love: A theory and practice of social 
change. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
Lawler, E. E. (2005). Creating high performance organizations. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 43, 10-17.  
Levin, K., Cashore, B., Bernstein, S., & Auld, G. (2012). Overcoming 
the tragedy of super wicked problems: Constraining our future 
selves to ameliorate global climate change. Policy Science, 45, 
123-152.
Macfarlane, I. (2006). The search for stability: Boyer lectures 2006. 
Sydney: ABC Books.
Mason, E. S., & Asher, R. E. (1973). The World Bank since Bretton 
Woods. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Nelson. K. (2008). Self in time: Emergence within a community of 
minds. In F. Sani (Ed.) Self continuity: Individual and collective 
perspectives (pp. 13-26). New York: Psychology Press.
Parfit, D. (1986). Reasons and persons. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press.
Pronin, E., Olivola, C. Y., & Kennedy, K. A. (2008). Doing unto future 
selves as you would do unto others: Psychological distance 
and decision-making. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34, 224-236.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of 
American community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Reich, R. (2009). Supercapitalism: The battle for democracy in an age 
of big business. London: Icon books.  
Reicher, S. (2008). Making a past fit for the future: The political and 
ontological dimensions of historical continuity. In F. Sani (Ed.) 
Self continuity: Individual and collective perspectives (pp. 145-
158). New York: Psychology Press.
15
WORKING PAPER SERIES   No.1 FEBRUARY 2014
Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory 
of planning. Policy Sciences, 4, 155-169.
Robinson, S., Kraatz, M., & Rousseau, D.  (1994). Changing 
obligations and the psychological contract: A longitudinal 
study. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 137-152.
Sachs, O. (1985). The man who mistook his wife for a hat. London: 
Picador.
Sadeh, N., & Karniol, R. (2012). The sense of self-continuity as a 
resource in adaptive coping with job loss. Journal of Vocational 
Behavior, 80, 93-99.
Sani, F. (2008). Introduction and overview. In F. Sani (Ed.) Self 
continuity: Individual and collective perspectives (pp. 1-12). New 
York: Psychology Press.
Sani, F., Bowe, M., & Herrera, M. (2008). Perceived collective 
continuity: Seeing groups as temporally enduring entities. In F. 
Sani (Ed.) Self continuity: Individual and collective perspectives 
(pp. 117-130). New York: Psychology Press.
Sassen, S. (1998). The mobility of labor and capital: A study in 
international investment and labor flow. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Saul, J. R. (1995). The unconscious civilization. Camberwell: Penguin 
Books.
Sennett, R. (2006). The culture of the new capitalism. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
van Gelder, J-L., Hershfield, H. E., & Nordgren, L. F. (2013). Vividness 
of future self predicts delinquency. Psychological Science, 24(6), 
974-980.
van Knippenberg, D., van Knippenberg, B., & Bobbio, A. (2008). 
Leaders as agents of continuity: Self continuity and resistance 
to collective change. In F. Sani (Ed.) Self continuity: Individual 
and collective perspectives (pp. 175-186). New York: Psychology 
Press.
16
SWINBURNE LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE
SLI Working Paper series
The Swinburne Leadership Institute’s Leadership for the 
Greater Good Working Paper Series was established in 2014 
to disseminate work-in-progress by members, Fellows and 
associates of the Swinburne Leadership Institute. 
Papers in the series include the revised text of presentations at 
SLI Dialogues (held monthly through the Australian academic 
year), conference and seminar presentations, research papers, 
review essays, and other reports. 
The series aims to encourage discussion and collaboration on 
ways of clarifying the meanings of the greater or common good 
and to enrich the understanding and practice of leadership in 
its service. Working papers are available at the SLI website: 
www.swinburne.edu.au/leadership-institute. 
The Working Papers in this series include:
1.  On leadership, continuity, and the common good                                            
Samuel Wilson, 2014
2.  Reimagining ethical leadership as relational, contextual,  
and political                        
Helena Liu, 2014
3.  Leadership tools for wicked problems 
John Fien and Samuel Wilson, 2014
4.  Chasing the honey bee: Enhancing leadership for sustainability 
John Fien, 2014
www.swinburne.edu.au/leadership-institute/publications
About the author
Samuel Wilson is a Research Fellow at the Swinburne 
Leadership Institute. He received his Master of Psychology 
(industrial/organisational psychology) and PhD (social 
psychology) from the University of Melbourne. After spending 
a year as a postdoctoral research fellow at the Melbourne 
Sustainable Society Institute at the University of Melbourne 
researching the adaptive and transformational capacity of 
rural communities, he joined Monash University as Lecturer in 
Psychology for two years, before moving to his present role at 
Swinburne University of Technology.
His empirical and theoretical work has been published in a 
number of journals, such as British Journal of Social Psychology, 
Social Networks, Ecology & Society, and European Management 
Journal, as well as book chapters in Handbook of Research on 
Technoself: Identity in a technological society and Global issues 
and ethical concerns in human enhancement technologies and a 
book The Moonlight Effect: Debunking business myths to improve 
wellbeing.
His research examines conceptions of humanness in the 
Anthropocene and in the debate about human enhancement 
technologies, respectively, as well as the causes and 
consequences of self-continuity, especially as it relates to 
leadership for the public good. 
About the Swinburne Leadership Institute
The Swinburne Leadership Institute (SLI) seeks to promote 
Leadership for the Greater Good across government, the 
private and not-for-profit sectors, and civil society. 
Our mission is to enrich the understanding and practice  
of authentic, ethical and sustainable forms of leadership  
in Australia.
Leadership for the Greater Good can take many forms. It 
always needs to be locally relevant and culturally appropriate. 
However, in all cases it recognises the legitimacy of the 
individual as citizen, the reality of our shared interests, and the 
importance of judiciously balancing competing interests  
in ways that enhance the public good.  
The emergence in Australia of a political, business and civil 
culture that elevates immediate private interests over  
long-term public interests is a worrying sign that the  
Greater Good and leadership in its service is insufficiently 
valued in our society. 
It is a social and research priority to understand the meaning 
and the myriad manifestations of Leadership for the Greater 
Good so as to enrich the practice of leadership in Australia.
Leadership for the Greater Good – Values
The Swinburne Leadership Institute’s conception of Leadership for the Greater 
Good is grounded in the values and principles embedded in the culture and 
aspirations of Swinburne University, including:
Innovation and creativity in solving real-world problems. 
Integrity, honesty and the highest ethical standards in everything we do.
Accountability to ourselves, each other, and the communities we serve through 
transparency and evidence-based decision making.
Celebration of diversity and respect the strength that difference creates. 
Teamwork and collaboration through mutual respect, open communication and 
the sharing of responsibility. 
Sustainability at personal, group, national and planetary scales.
Swinburne Leadership Institute
swinburne.edu.au/leadership-institute
Working Paper Series
 On leadership, continuity,  
and the common good
 FURTHER INFORMATION
(03) 9214 5717 
PO Box 218 Hawthorn  VIC  3122 
leadershipinstitute@swin.edu.au 
swinburne.edu.au/leadership-institute
Blog: http://blogs.swinburne.edu.au/leadershipinstitute
 https://twitter.com/swinleadership
 Linkedin group – Swinburne Leadership Institute
No. 1 February 2014
Samuel Wilson 
Research Fellow, Swinburne Leadership Institute
